Caterpillar recently embarked on an ambitious program to radically change how it markets and sells key products of its Building Construction Products division (BCP). The goal was to move from a strict build-to-order strategy, in which customers selected one of millions of possible configurations, to a Lane Strategy in which the majority of their customers would choose machines from just over 100 configurations. To successfully make such a radical change Caterpillar needed to quantify how customers would potentially react to the new strategy, and how such a drastic simplification of their product line would a↵ect their manufacturing, sales, and service costs. We embarked on a study with Caterpillar to explicitly model customers' 
Introduction
In 2010 Caterpillar (CAT) unveiled a dramatically new strategy for pricing and marketing their "BHL" series of small backhoe loaders, one of the most popular products within their Building Construction Products (BCP) division. This new strategy has radically changed how BCP markets and sells their small machines, focusing the bulk of CAT's customers on a few popular models.
Previously, BCP o↵ered customers an almost unlimited variety of products, built-to-order, priced according to an itemized price list. This maintained very high customer satisfaction, but greatly complicated BCP's supply chain and service operations: With such broad demand dealers had to hold large amounts of inventory to give a representation of the many possible choices.
Moreover, Caterpillar had to maintain documentation and provide service for an extremely heterogeneous group of machines, driving up their costs. Finally, as demand was fragmented across thousands of configurations, forecasting was problematic, leading to frustration among suppliers. Thus CAT's BCP division saw great potential for a rationalization of their BHL product line.
Three crucial questions had to be answered before devising and implementing such a new strategy:
1. "How would customers react to a product line reduction?" Answering this question required developing an understanding of how customers value di↵erent machines.
2. "How much could be saved by focusing their BHL product lines?" Answering this question required developing an understanding of the general form of the cost of complexity.
3. "How should we configure our new BHL product line?" Specifically, which machines should we o↵er, and at what prices?
The primary contribution of this paper is to demonstrate the power of our three-step analytical framework for product line simplification.
Step 1 answers question 1 by capturing customer behavior using migration lists; step 2 answers question 2 by creating a detailed mathematical representation of the company's cost of complexity (CoC); and step 3 answers the final question by combining the migration lists and the CoC function into an optimization model that proposes an improved product line. The generality and flexibility of our framework stem from the fact that the mathematical and statistical techniques used in steps 1, 2, and 3 can be tailored to the situation at hand, as long as they produce the output required by each subsequent step. We also demonstrate that our framework can be used as an e↵ective what-if tool for managers, allowing them to successfully evaluate di↵erent solutions under varying problem conditions.
To answer CAT's first question we leveraged BCP's extensive dealer network to gain an understanding of the segmentation, preference patterns, and price sensitivities of BCP's customer base.
We combined this dealer knowledge with the entire line's sales history over the previous two years to construct a detailed analytical model of customer preferences and substitution (see Section 4). This produced a model of how BCP's customers would react to changes in the product line.
To answer the second question, we built a detailed model to estimate the total direct and indirect costs of complexity, using an extensive empirical analysis of CAT's cost data, and surveys with CAT's engineering and marketing experts. This model captured both variety-based (driven by number of options o↵ered) and attribute-based (driven by specific complex options) costs and benefits of product diversity, from manufacturing, to spare parts, to sales e↵ort. (See Section 5).
We then combined the customer and cost models within a mathematical programming model, in Section 6, to evaluate di↵erent product lines against randomized demand patterns and market scenarios. In coordination with expert input from CAT, this step determined the right product mix for the line, o↵ering customers broad choice while also controlling the costs of complexity.
The outcome of the project was implemented as a new Lane strategy, o↵ering machines within three di↵erent lanes: Lane 1, the Express Lane, featuring four built-to-stock configuration choices at an expected lead time of a few days; Lane 2, the Standard Lane, featuring 120 predefined configurations, built-to-order at an expected lead time of a few weeks; and Lane 3, the A-La-Carte Lane, built to order machines with an expected lead time of a few months.
Caterpillar committed to a phased roll-out of the project, publishing both an (old) a-la-carte price list and a (new) Lane price list in 2010, and transitioned to a single Lane price list in 2011.
The Lane 1 configurations were immediately able to capture a significant portion of demand, contributing to a reduction in warranty costs on the order of 10%, as predicted by our analysis.
Caterpillar has continued expanding and refining their BHL lane strategy -for example, they have now reduced the Lane 1 configurations to only two. In addition, Caterpillar has applied variations of our cost of complexity analysis to other divisions within the firm, helping to guide their extensions of the lane approach -a fundamental strategic change -to the entire company.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has ever combined an empirically-developed CoC function as detailed and comprehensive as ours, with customer preferences regarding product substitution, in an optimization algorithm that was implemented with real-life data, at an industrial scale. Moreover, our work ultimately produced recommendations that were actually implemented and verified to generate significant improvements.
In Section 2 we place our work within the product line optimization and practical application literature. Then, in Section 3 we briefly describe the BHL lines. In Section 4 we present our key tool for answering the first of Caterpillar's questions ("How would customers react to a product line reduction?"), our customer migration list model. Next, in Section 5, we describe how we answered the second question ("How much could be saved by focusing their BHL product lines?") by presenting our Cost of Complexity model. We then combine these in our optimization model, in Section 6, to answer the ultimate question, ("How should we configure our new product line?").
We present the results and insights from our analysis in Sections 7 and 8, and conclude in Section 9.
Literature Review
The marketing literature illustrates the di culty of predicting the e↵ects of reducing product line complexity: Some works describe how narrowing a product line may detract from brand image or market share, e.g. Chong et al. (1998) , while others posit that reducing the breadth of lines and focusing on customer "favorites" may actually increase sales, see for example Broniarczyk et al. (1998) . Our model is consistent with both of these streams: If a customer finds a product that meets her needs (i.e. a "favorite") she will make a purchase; if such a product and its acceptable alternatives are no longer part of the product line, she will not.
There is also a long history of empirically studying the impact of product line complexity on costs. Foster and Gupta (1990) analyze the responses to a questionnaire to assess the impacts of volume-based, e ciency-based, and complexity-based cost drivers within an electronics manufacturing company. They find that manufacturing overhead is associated with volume, but not complexity or variety. Banker et al. (1995) use data from 32 manufacturing plants to evaluate the same question; they find an association of overhead costs with both volume and transactions, which they take as a measure of complexity. Anderson (1995) examines the e↵ect of product mix heterogeneity on overhead costs in three textile factories. Of the seven di↵erent types of heterogeneity she identifies, two are shown to be associated with higher overhead costs. Fisher and Ittner (1999) analyze data from a GM assembly plant, finding that option variety contributes to higher labor and overhead costs. We complement these works by explicitly formulating and calibrating a detailed model to estimate the total direct and indirect costs (and benefits) of complexity for the BHL line at Caterpillar, based on expert surveys and empirical analysis of cost data.
Product line optimization has a rich literature: Kok et al. (2009) and Tang (2010) provide recent surveys. Several recent papers consider the strategic selection of a product line via equilibrium analysis: Alptekinoglu and Corbett (2008) , Chen et al. (2008) , Chen et al. (2010) , and Tang and Yin (2010) . Our paper uses math programming to optimize a more detailed model. Bitran and Ferrer (2007) consider the problem of determining the optimal price and composition of a single bundle of items and a single segment of customers in a competitive market. They provide extensions to multiple segments or multiple bundles based on mathematical programming, but this latter problem becomes very complex, and is left as future research. Wang et al. (2009) use branch-and-price to select a line to maximize the share of market, testing their algorithm on problems with a small number of items but many levels of product attributes on simulated and commercial data. And Schoen (2010) extends the work of Chen and Hausman (2000) to allow more general costs and heterogeneous customers. None of these algorithms have been shown to be suitable for problems anywhere near the size and complexity of Caterpillar's (thousands of customers and millions of potential configurations). This has led to the investigation of heuristic line optimization methods: For example Fruchter et al. (2006) apply a genetic algorithm to simulated and survey data; and Belloni et al. (2008) compare several heuristics to the optimal solution for small (up to 5-product) instances. Neither of these are actual implementations. Kok and Fisher (2007) develop and apply a methodology to estimate demand and substitution patterns for a Dutch supermarket chain, based on empirical demand data. They develop an iterative heuristic that determines the facings allocated to di↵erent categories, and the inventory of individual elements within the categories. In contrast: (i) We develop an empirical cost of complexity function; (ii) We use a more comprehensive substitution mechanism, the migration list. In Kok and Fisher (2007) , customers who find their first choice absent will substitute at most once (so if their second choice is absent they leave); (iii) We develop a single product lane strategy for use by all dealers in the network; and (iv) Our results are based on actual implementation. Fisher and Vaidyanathan (2011) explore how to select retail store assortments; their work enhances a localized choice model to make it operational in practice. Our models share a localized choice model with randomization, location at extant configurations, and preference sets for substitution (i.e. our migration lists). But whereas in Fisher and Vaidyanathan (2011) all customers who prefer a particular product have the same preference set, we randomize the option utilities of each customer, so customers who purchased the same product may spawn di↵erent migration lists. Furthermore, we use an additive model of attribute utilities, theirs is multiplicative.
Other important di↵erences include: Fisher and Vaidyanathan (2011) estimate demand intensity and substitution parameters from historical data, whereas we use expert opinion to get utilities, and generate demand by randomizing past sales. In contrast to our approach that seeks to maximize profits using our empirical cost of complexity function, they maximize revenue with greedy heuristics. Finally, they show just two examples -snack cakes and tires -implementing a small set of their recommended changes with the tires line, increasing revenue by 5.8%. Ward et al. (2010) is another recent paper that rigorously applies an analytical framework to the product line problem, developing two tools to help Hewlett-Packard. Like Caterpillar, HP has product lines that could, in theory, span millions of di↵erent configurations.
The first tool develops a comprehensive complexity cost function, comprised of variable and fixed costs, to be used when evaluating the introduction of new products. This complexity cost function has some similarities to ours, but focuses more on inventory costs, lacking anything related to our attribute based costing. Furthermore, any substitution e↵ects on inventory, which they term cannibalization, are subjectively estimated at a high level.
Their second tool uses a heuristic to construct a line from a selection of extant products. This tool does not use their complexity cost function, nor does it consider substitution -rather it constructs a Pareto frontier of those top k products that would cover the desired percentage of historical order demand (or order revenue). So while they seek the appropriate line to satisfy possibly multi-product orders assuming customers will not substitute, we find the correct line of products to satisfy orders for individual products in which customers may substitute. Rash and Kempf (2012) recently published work on product line design and scheduling at Intel.
They find the set of products to produce, for di↵erent markets, to maximize profit over a time horizon while obeying budget and availability constraints. They perform hierarchical decomposition, utilizing genetic algorithms along with MIPs. This work is quite di↵erent from ours in that their demand is viewed as deterministic, so substitution is not included in the model.
The three-step framework we use was first introduced in Yunes et al. (2007) , which describes a product line simplification e↵ort implemented at John Deere & Co. Our current work shares some of its methodology with Yunes et al. (2007) , but extends their work in several dimensions. Owing to the form of our endogenous function, we use a di↵erent optimization procedure, the "di↵erential approach." (iv) To achieve CAT's aggressive product line goals, we make decisions at the option level, rather than the machine level, as in Yunes et al. (2007) . We also incorporate pricing decisions and migration across models, which are not possible in Yunes et al. (2007) .
BHL Product Families
Our product line simplification e↵ort at CAT involved four models in the backhoe loader (BHL) family: 416E, 420E, 430E, and 450E. The 416E is the basic model, while the 420E, 430E and 450E provide progressively superior horsepower and capabilities. We refer to a complete machine as a configuration. Each configuration is composed of features; for each feature, a configuration specifies one of the options within that feature. For example, the feature stick has the options standard and electronic. Table 1 contains a summary of the features present in each BHL model that were included in our project, together with the number of options in each. A dash "-" indicates that a feature is not present in a model or was not included in our analysis.
To create a complete configuration, a customer selects one option for each of its features, configurations have never been, and most likely will never be, built. The mere fact that they could be purchased, however, creates overhead costs for CAT's operations (see Section 5).
So how many configurations are built? Figure 1 depicts the number of di↵erent configurations (left panel) and options (right panel) required to capture specified revenue and sales targets for eight month's worth of sales data for model 420E. Of the 569 built configurations, 400 were needed to capture about 95% of revenues and sales volume. Similarly, 41 out of the 45 available options were needed to capture at least 90% of revenues and sales volume. Therefore, in order to achieve the sought reductions in product o↵erings, it was imperative to steer purchases toward a considerably smaller subset of products and options.
Modeling Customer Behavior
The key to evaluating the potential pitfalls of reducing a product line is a good understanding of customers' purchasing flexibility: while customers will require that the product they are buying satisfy some minimum requirements, not every feature needs to be in perfect alignment with their expectations. In addition, customers typically display some degree of price flexibility. The centerpiece of our approach to capture flexibility is the migration list, an ordered list of products within the customer's price and utility tolerance (see Yunes et al. 2007 for details). The first configuration on the list is the customer's first choice; if available the customer will buy that configuration. If that configuration is unavailable and there is a second configuration on the list the customer will buy that if available, and so on. If none of the configurations on a customer's list are available, that customer buys nothing (i.e. goes to a competitor). As mentioned in Section 2, this is an enhanced localized choice model, in the spirit of Fisher and Vaidyanathan (2011) .
For each unique purchase in our database, we construct a corresponding migration list. Many factors come into play when constructing a customer's migration list. Below is pseudo-code showing how the process works; each step is described in detail in a subsection below.
Construction of Migration Lists: For each customer C who bought a configuration over the past H months repeat:
1. Let M C be the configuration (machine) bought by C.
2. Apply segmentation rules to M C (Section 4.1) to place C in a segment S C .
3. Based on the price and utility of M C , and on characteristics of segment S C , construct a randomized list of configurations, L C , as acceptable alternatives to M C (Section 4.2).
4. Sort L C in non-increasing order of configuration utility, pruning it if it exceeds the maximum allowed length (Section 4.3).
Customer Segmentation
Customer segmentation plays an important role in the creation of migration lists because it a↵ects customer flexibility. For example, customers who live in extreme weather conditions are unlikely to buy a configuration that does not include a cab with climate control, and customers who need to carry very heavy loads are not willing to sacrifice horsepower. We used focus groups composed of CAT experts and actual customers to identify the main customer segments and their characteristics. This produced six segments: performance extreme (PE), performance extreme versatility (PEV), performance mild (PM), performance mild versatility (PMV), commodity extreme A set of segmentation rules was created to classify each purchase: given a configuration, its customer segment is determined by the presence and/or absence of certain options, represented as part numbers. For example, there are eight ways for a 416E loader to be placed in segment PE.
One is: two out of the options 2146913, 2099929, and 2139293 must be present (89HP powertrain and e-stick), and one out of the options 2044161, 2044162, and 2284602 must be present (cabs), and the option 2120206 cannot be present (6-function hydraulics), and neither option 2497912, nor option 2624213 can be present (one-way and combined auxiliary lines).
In addition to the segment-specific option utilities that will be discussed in Section 4.2, the other segment-specific parameters that a↵ect migration list generation are the reservation price and reservation utility (see Section 4.3).
Estimating Utilities
For each of the customer segments identified in Section 4.1, we calculate option utilities as follows. First, to estimate the importance of a model's features, we asked a group of CAT employees with sales and manufacturing expertise to use the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty 1980) .
AHP asks experts to estimate di↵erent feature's relative importance, on a scale from 1 (equally important) to 9 (much more important). After these pairwise relationships have been established, the scores are transformed into absolute scores, the relative importance of each feature. The same group of experts is then asked to rank the options within each feature on a scale from 0 to 100. These option scores are scaled so that the option receiving a score of 100 is assigned a value equal to its feature's relative importance. These scaled scores represent the option utilities.
We demonstrate this on a simplified example with three features: sticks, powertrain, and backhoe hydraulics. Assume the experts have ranked the pairwise importance as shown in the "Pairwise" portion of Table 2 . The numbers in the "Sticks" row mean that sticks are as important as powertrain, and three times more important than hydraulics. Similarly, the second row indicates that powertrain is twice as important as hydraulics. Note that a perfectly consistent group of experts would have said that powertrain is three times as important as hydraulics, but in practice they may not be this consistent. Disparities like this are not unexpected, and are taken into account by the AHP. The AHP then calculates the column sums for each feature (last row of the "Pairwise" portion of Table 2 ), normalizes each column, and takes row averages to determine the final relative importance for each feature, as shown in the "Normalized" portion of Table 2. A final check is then performed to make sure that any inconsistencies are within an acceptable tolerance. Now let us assume that the backhoe hydraulics feature has three options: 4, 5, and 6 function, assigned scores of 15, 50 and 100 by the experts, respectively. When we rescale these scores to a scale from 0 to 0.1698 (the relative importance of hydraulics from Table 2) , we obtain the final utilities of these three options: 0.0255, 0.0849, and 0.1698, respectively.
The utility of a complete configuration is estimated as the sum of the utilities of its options.
Although this additive method has been studied and used extensively (Keeney and Rai↵a 1976) , other ways of estimating option and configuration utilities are also possible (e.g. conjoint analysis and its many variations, Hauser and Rao 2004) . One advantage of our migration list approach is that it is independent of the way in which utilities are calculated: The only thing it requires is a score ranking the relative desirability of each configuration.
To validate the utility values calculated for each of the options -for every BHL model in all customer segments -we conducted a survey asking actual customers to choose among alternate configurations. Caterpillar then used t-tests to examine the di↵erences between these surveys and the utility estimates provided by CAT experts. These di↵erences were not statistically significant.
Building Migration Lists
Although customers of a given segment tend to behave similarly, they are certainly not identical.
To account for variations within each segment, we modify the migration list procedure in several ways. First, for each segment we randomly perturb the relative importance (and, consequently, the option utilities) of randomly selected features. The number of features to perturb is an input parameter (for CAT, this was around three). Given a perturbation factor t (approximately ten), the change to a feature's relative importance is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval [ t%, +t%] . CAT also did not want customers to have lists containing configurations too dissimilar from the one purchased. Therefore, a number called disparity factor (around five) limits how many options an alternative machine can have that di↵er from M C . Finally, the model generates the customer's reservation price and reservation utility; again, these values are randomly picked from a predetermined interval around the price and utility of M C . 1
We collect the above procedures into a Constraint Programming (CP) model (Marriott and Stuckey 1998) that finds feasible configurations for L C . This CP model needs to know what constitutes a feasible configuration, i.e. which options are compatible. We use configuration rules to describe these interdependences. For example, for model 420E, one rule is: if a configuration has option 9R58666 and either option 2139272 or 2139273, then it cannot have option 9R5321. These rules may involve tens of di↵erent options; logical conditions of this form can be easily handled by CP models. After all feasible configurations are found, those that exceed the generated reservation price or fall short of the reservation utility are pruned from the customer's migration list.
Next, configurations are sorted in non-increasing order of total utility and L C is truncated, if desired, while respecting two conditions. First, if L C is truncated M C must always be retained.
Second, we assume customers place M C first, regardless of M C 's utility, with a certain probability (the factor ; for CAT it was between 0.3 and 0.7). This is an attempt to capture the fact that some customers are attracted to their M C for reasons we cannot capture with utilities.
Migration across di↵erent models is also possible. In this case we apply a set of migration rules that map a purchased configuration M 1 of model m 1 (e.g. 416E) to its most likely counterpart M 2 , of a di↵erent model m 2 (e.g. 420E). Once M 2 is known, we generate alternatives as if it were the customer's original purchase, and include them (together with alternatives to
2 configurations may have higher utilities, when L C is sorted it may contain almost no highly ranked m 1 configurations. Thus, to capture the fact that customer C originally preferred an m 1 machine, we inflate the utilities of all m 1 machines in L C by a preference factor (between 10 and 20%). As a result, L C ends up with machines of both models, but it does not allow utilities to overemphasize the attractiveness of m 2 machines. According to CAT, the plausible model migrations are from 416E to 420E and from 430E to 420E.
As was done for option utilities, we also conducted an extensive validation study with CAT experts to evaluate the quality of our migration lists: Lists were repeatedly generated and examined to determine whether the substitution patterns indicated were realistic. Throughout this process the experts provided valuable feedback that helped us fine tune our input parameters. After a few iterations, CAT experts agreed that our migration lists could be safely used by our optimization algorithm. Before we present that algorithm, we describe how we estimate a key element of our objective function, the cost of complexity.
Capturing Cost of Complexity
We now estimate how a line reduction might a↵ect costs. This is a significant challenge, as product variety a↵ects many functional areas. In most areas the direction of the impact is clear: material planning costs increase as the number of options to be included increases. In some areas, however, the impact is not straightforward: sales costs may increase as variety increases because a large line may overwhelm customers and sales personnel; on the other hand, sales costs may decrease in variety if it is easier to satisfy a demanding customer. We refer to all costs impacted by the variety of product o↵erings, i.e. number of features and options, as the cost of complexity.
In this section we describe how we built a cost of complexity function for CAT. This includes both data collection and data analysis to determine and estimate the necessary parameters. The result of this process is used in our optimization model in Section 6.
Data collection stage
In conjunction with CAT experts we selected nine functional areas that we felt were most significantly a↵ected by product complexity. We met with these areas' representatives in a focus group setting that also included an information systems (IS) representative and a project manager from CAT. The primary goals of these meetings were: (i) to identify up to three major processes within each functional area most impacted by product complexity; (ii) to understand which costmeasures capture the impact of complexity for each major process; and (iii) to identify particular product features and/or options that have the largest impact on the complexity cost.
We then contacted an accounting representative from CAT who, working with the IS representative and the functional areas, identified which of the identified cost measures were obtainable.
For some of the processes we identified there was no appropriate accounting data available; hence, we used an alternative cost measure as a proxy. Table 3 lists the functional areas, processes impacted, and measures used; when alternate cost measures are used they are denoted by a dagger ( †). We elaborate on several cost measures in Table 3 .
Cost of supplier delivery performance refers to a program aimed at improving availability; as a part of this program, CAT contacts suppliers with low delivery performance to improve their processes. We use the cost allocated to this program as a proxy for the cost of supplier operations.
In the customer acquisition department, CAT calculates sales variance cost by tracking all the discounts that go into making a sale: invoice, extended service, cost of free attachments, etc.
We use this measure to approximate cost of customer acquisition. We rely on CAT's accounting system for cost estimates of engineering changes (mainly consisting of payroll to engineers working on changes) and engineering of new releases (mainly consisting of the payroll of developers and engineers who work on new parts, and costs of testing and design equipment).
Another outcome of our focus group discussions was the observation that there were two distinct ways in which complexity a↵ects di↵erent business departments: Variety Based and Attribute
Based. We discuss this distinction now.
Variety Based vs. Attribute Based complexity.
Certain processes are impacted by the number of options o↵ered for a feature, while others are more impacted by the presence of specific options. For example, material planners calculate requirements for each type of bucket o↵ered, which increases their departmental cost. If one type of bucket is eliminated, the cost of complexity goes down proportionally, regardless of which option is eliminated. We refer to this e↵ect as Variety Based Complexity, or VBC.
In contrast, for the Cab/Canopy feature, the Deluxe Cab with Air Conditioning is significantly more complicated than a canopy. Hence, if we reduce the number of options in the Cab/Canopy feature, the change in cost would be di↵erent depending on which particular option was eliminated. We refer to this e↵ect as Attribute Based Complexity or ABC. Note that attribute based complexity is not limited to single options; it is the combination of Deluxe Cab with Air Conditioning that drives complexity cost. In Table 4 , we summarize the features that were identified as most important during our focus group meetings, along with their VBC or ABC classifications.
In addition to the VBC/ABC classification, there were two other important considerations that came out of our focus group discussions: time lag and volume drivers of complexity.
Time lag of the impact of complexity
Our discussions revealed that the e↵ect of complexity on di↵erent processes may be felt at di↵erent times. For example, assembly cost today is impacted by the product complexity being built today, while warranty costs are a↵ected by complexity that was o↵ered a certain time ago (positive time lag), and engineering and marketing costs may be impacted by the complexity that will be o↵ered in the future (negative time lag). Based on our focus group discussions we estimated the number of months of time lag for di↵erent cost pools. Later (in Section 5.2.1), we use this information in estimating the parameters of the cost of complexity function. Table 5 summarizes our analysis of time lag parameters.
Volume drivers for complexity
Another important aspect in understanding the impact of complexity is understanding di↵erent volume metrics and how they a↵ect costs. Not surprisingly, most areas are a↵ected by sales volume:
costs increase as more items are produced and sold. However, costs are also driven by other volumes. For example, product support is impacted by the number of unique configurations built, because quality may decrease when employees have to work on many di↵erent configurations. 
Other processes, such as assembly planning and engineering, are impacted by the complexity o↵ered, as CAT should be ready to assemble any feasible configuration o↵ered. Later (Section 5.2.1), we use this information to determine which predictors to include in the cost model for each department. Table 6 summarizes of the most important volume drivers for each department.
Cost of complexity function
Before defining the cost functions and notation associated with VBC and ABC costs, we present supplementary notation that will be common to both. We use small letters for superscripts and subscripts, bold letters for sets, and capital letters for numbers coming from collected data. 
Estimation of VBC e↵ect
To estimate the VBC e↵ect for each department d, C d V BC , we use the Cobb-Douglas log-linear function. The Cobb-Douglas function is frequently used for estimating non-linear relationships (see Greene 2000) ; it can capture di↵erent returns to scale and has several attractive analytical properties. Two properties are of particular convenience for us: First, the log transformation of the Cobb-Douglas function is linear and hence can be estimated using linear regression. Second, a partial derivative of the Cobb-Douglas function has a simple form that is useful in the derivation of the di↵erential cost of complexity (Section 5.3). After estimating the models, we validate our Cobb-Douglas function via several goodness of fit tests (e.g. Figure 2 ).
Using lower-case Greek letters to represent estimated parameters, the Cobb-Douglas function
Where:
V Total sales volume;
U Total number of unique configurations sold;
The size of the cost pool at department d relative to other departments;
The e↵ect of the sales volume on the cost of complexity; The e↵ect of the number of unique configurations sold on the cost of complexity;
The e↵ect of the cardinality of feature f on the cost of complexity;
We fit this function to the data to estimate Table 5 .
The nature of the data suggests that there is serial correlation, which was confirmed with the Durbin-Watson statistic for all cost pools. Therefore, we use the Yule-Walker approach to fit the data to the log transformation of C 
Next, we fitted collected data to equation (2) and obtained statistical models for all depart- ments. We analyzed our model using both graphical and numerical tests: we examined the plots of residuals for normality, heteroscedasticity, and for influential outliers (an example of these plots for one of the cost pools, customer acquisition cost, is depicted in Figure 2 ). We also checked for significance of the models, and only accepted models with reasonable coe cients of variation (see Table 7 ) and low RMSE. The estimates that are statistically significant at the p = 0.05 level are marked with an asterisk in Table 7 . Hence, not all of the originally identified departments were included in the final cost of complexity function, and some of the sets F d were reduced.
First, we comment on the coe cient of determination of the models (R 2 ) in Table 7 . Some Table 7 : Fit results. A * indicates statistically significant parameters at p = 0.05 level. Subscripts HC, C, CW and H stand for hydraulic combinations, cabs, counterweights, and hydraulics. Table 7 are consistent with our expectations.
Similarly, when analyzing the models for warranty costs, we expect that earlier failures would be less predictable, due to learning e↵ects. The results are again consistent with this expectation; the coe cient of determination increases for repair costs as the time of failure increases. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that our results are robust, we use ranges of parameters in running the optimization model as described in Section 7.
We comment on some findings from Table 7 . Increasing the number of options for hydraulics and cabs decreases the cost of customer acquisition:
CA H < 0 and CA C < 0. A large portion of the cost of customer acquisition consists of sales variance or discounts given to customers by dealers in order to attract business. Cabs and hydraulics are very important considerations for customers;
having a large selection of options for these features makes it easier for the dealer to make a sale, decreasing the sales variance. This finding is in line with the intuition of sales and marketing representatives from CAT. However, this was the first time CAT was able to quantify this e↵ect.
Another interesting observation is that sales volume has a negative impact on product support costs (i.e. repair costs). When volume goes up CAT employees assemble more machines with the same options, employees get more experienced with particular options, and the number of mistakes decreases. This intuition again seemed plausible to CAT, but had never been quantified.
Guided by our study, CAT subsequently has performed similar cost of complexity analysis in other product divisions and obtained comparable results.
Finally, we tested our predictions by using the first year of data to fit the model, then calculated the predicted values for the next four years, and finally compared them to the actual data. Figure 3 shows that a large majority of the actual values lie within the 95% confidence interval around the predicted values, again for customer acquisition cost.
Estimating ABC e↵ect
From focus groups, we identified that ABC e↵ects were observed primarily in three departments: assembly, production planning, and engineering. The nature of work in these departments suggested that the relationship between ABC cost and complexity is linear: if it takes 5 extra minutes to install a particular option on a machine, this cost will apply to each machine that contains the option. This coincided with expert opinion, which posited that learning e↵ects are 
Where: V Set of number of configurations sold for all options:
The cost parameters o and ! o were estimated using expert opinions, time studies, and accounting information from all functional areas that identified this option as important; see Table 8 .
Di↵erential cost of complexity function
Instead of computing the total revenue and total cost of each line, our complexity cost function enables us to start with the current line and compute the estimated change in revenue and the estimated change in cost as the number of features and options change. To compute this "di↵er-ential" cost of complexity, we take the partial derivatives of C variables, and then combine them into a di↵erential cost of complexity function. Specifically, the change in cost of complexity when the number of options for feature f changes is:
substituting the definition of
This di↵erential cost of complexity function includes the predicted value of 
Using (4) the total change in complexity cost due to a change in the number of options o↵ered for feature f is then estimated as:
where N f represents the change in the number of options in feature f after line optimization; similarly we will precede V , U , V o , N , N d , and V with to represent change. We will formally define these functions in Section 6 when we introduce the optimization model.
In an analogous fashion we di↵erentiate the cost of complexity function with respect to volume and number of unique configurations. This yields the total di↵erential cost of complexity
To capture the di↵erential ABC e↵ect, we must account for the change in the number of options o↵ered and sold. If we eliminate an option o from the price list, the cost of complexity will decrease by o and if sales with option o deviate from V o , the cost will change accordingly:
Finally, the total di↵erential cost of complexity is:
Because the complexity cost function is non-linear, this approach is accurate only for small changes. The accuracy of this approximation may be tested by calculating the actual change in total cost of complexity C V BC between the original product line and the optimized product line, and then comparing this to the result of the approximation D V BC . In our experiments, the di↵erential cost approximation was within 5% of the calculated change in the cost of complexity, which was acceptable for the purposes of our project 2 . As a result, equation (8), with estimated parameters, becomes a part of the objective function in the optimization model of Section 6.
The Optimization Model
With the migration lists from Section 4, which capture customer flexibility information, and equation (8) of Section 5, which contains the di↵erential complexity cost information, we can now describe our optimization model. We use a mixed-integer program to select the set of options and configurations o↵ered, and their prices, to maximize total revenue from sales minus complexity costs. We use customer purchases in 2006 as the basis for generating our migration lists.
In addition to the data defined in Section 5, our optimization uses the following data:
• I -The set of all customers;
• L i -The ordered set of configurations in the migration list of customer i 2 I;
• J -The set of all possible configurations;
• O j -The set of all options in configuration j 2 J ;
• R i -Reservation price of customer i 2 I; this could be made machine dependent if desired;
• M -Maximum reservation price over all customers (M = max i2I R i );
• C j , C 0 j , B j , P j -Cost, variable cost, base price, and current sale price of configuration j 2 J , respectively. Variable cost C 0 j is an internal CAT figure, lower than C j , whose purpose is to enforce a constraint on the average profit margin over all machines sold (see (16)).
The decision variables are as follows (a o was already defined in Section 5.2.2):
• a o = 1 if option o 2 O is available, 0 otherwise.
• q j = 1 if configuration j 2 J is bought by some customer, 0 otherwise;
where o is defined in Section 5.2.2);
• r ij -Profit obtained from customer i if she purchases configuration j (i 2 I, j 2 L i ).
We now provide precise definitions to the following terms that appear in (6) and (7):
The objective function maximizes the total profit from sales ( P i2I P j2L i r ij ) minus the di↵erential cost of complexity given by equation (8) of Section 5:
Our optimization model uses the following constraints, where max inc is the maximum allowed percentage price increase for a configuration:
Constraint (9) We can turn o↵ the price optimization aspect of the model by removing variables p o , constraints (14)- (16), making max inc = 0 in (13), and substituting P j for B j + P Our optimization models have around 850,000 variables and 1.8 million constraints, and they are solved using ILOG CPLEX Optimizer with default parameters. Typical solution times range from 6 to 8 hours, including preprocessing.
Results from Our Analysis
CAT's goal was to make a drastic reduction in the number of configurations o↵ered without significantly impacting customer satisfaction and market share. How to achieve such a goal, or whether such an outcome was even possible, was unclear at the outset of the project: Optimizing their product line required careful understanding and modeling of potential losses due to reduced o↵erings, and potential savings due to reduced cost of complexity. Since this reduction would present customers with fewer configurations, CAT assumed each remaining configuration could be priced a little lower; the reduced cost of complexity would allow this while maintaining profit.
Throughout our analysis, to ensure that our recommendations were robust we ran the optimization model across a range of parameters and migration list lengths.
Stage 1: Focusing on Configuration and Option Reduction
As an initial benchmark for our optimization, we first sought to identify the set of configurations that maximized profit at the current option prices, assuming limited customer migration (no more than a dozen configurations on a migration list, and no migration across models). While profits did increase, we obtained very little reduction in the number of configurations, except when a reduction was explicitly enforced by the constraint P j2J q j  (1 min conf red)|J |. Moreover, forcing a large reduction resulted in a significant decrease of sales revenue.
Given these results, we hypothesized that further reducing the cost of complexity would require significant cuts in options. Hence, a new constraint was added to the model to force option reduction: P o2O a o  (1 min opt red)|O|. We re-ran the optimization model forcing a reduction in the number of configurations and the number of options. Reducing options did succeed in reducing configurations, in some solutions by as much as 94%, and increased profit by generating a large cost of complexity reduction. But it also resulted in a drop in sales volume of up to 67%. This disturbed CAT team members since the company has always prided itself on its market share.
Fulfilling customer demand therefore became an important new metric of the analysis.
Stage 2: Opening Up Choices
Thus in the next phase of our analysis we wanted to explore what results would be possible if customers were significantly more flexible, possibly as a result of price incentives. We modeled this flexibility in two ways: We increased the migration list length (to 100 configurations) and we enabled model-to-model migration.
This approach started to generate encouraging results. A solution emerged with an increase in profit of 8.8%, less than a 2% reduction in sales volume, and a reduction in configurations equal to 65%. But further analysis showed that the number of options had not decreased significantly.
The increase in profit came from a decrease in the number of configurations, and increases in price paid by customers who migrated to slightly more expensive configurations. Performing sensitivity analysis confirmed this conclusion: expecting a large reduction in options was not realistic. However, a large reduction in configurations was possible.
This resulted in a problem for CAT: Without a reduction of options, how would this new set of configurations be presented to the customers? Restaurants can get by with a 3-4 page menu that lists all their entrees. But no customer would flip through a menu of 70-90 pages listing all the possible BHL configurations. A new scheme had to be devised.
Stage 3: Standardization and Options Packages
We decided to try two new strategies to concentrate customer demand on a manageable number of configurations. The first strategy was standardization: Could options such as High Ambient
Cooler and Engine Heater be made standard across all configurations? Optimization models with these options forced into every configuration yielded cost reductions that justified a reduction in price large enough to make the standardized configurations attractive to customers, while maintaining sales volumes and profit. Other rarely used options were eliminated using a similar approach. For example, the Cab/Canopy options were cut from five to two.
The second strategy was creating packages of options commonly found together. For example, guided by customer segment preferences, a single pair of loader hydraulics and powertrain options most likely to meet each segment's needs was proposed. Manual inspection and cluster analysis of the best solutions found so far led to the discovery of other options often found together.
The optimization was then run assuming standardization and option packaging, with constraints on the maximum price increase. This yielded the final product hierarchy for the 420E series, shown in Figure 4 : It consists of 9 base-machine-assembly (BMA) packages, 5 finished-toorder (FTO) packages, and 3 hydraulics options, for a total of 135 possible configurations, some of them anticipated to be much more popular than others.
Pricing optimization showed that with these 135 configurations, revenue from sales could increase by almost 7% and profit by 15%, with 99.6% demand fulfillment. Interestingly, 76% of the projected cost of complexity savings came from reductions in finished goods inventory and warranty costs (in particular, the cost of addressing failures in the first 100 hours of machine operation). Since the goal of the project was to maintain similar profit levels (rather than seeking increases), the team determined appropriate option price reductions to drive dealer behavior toward these configurations while maintaining profit. The proposed pricing policy resulted in an anticipated reduction in profit from sales of 4%, which was easily made up by the reduction in cost of complexity to yield a total profit increase of 4.8%. We had finally found the very small subset of configurations that we believed was broad enough to satisfy CAT's customers and dealers, but also focused enough to drive operational and supply chain e ciencies.
This final recommendation was presented to CAT, and approved.
8 Implementation Details
Initial Implementation
The implementation of such a dramatic change faced challenges. The first one was a concern that our solution would restrict customer choice too much, resulting in excessive lost sales. Caterpillar therefore showed the proposed packages to a subset of dealers, including their top 15 dealers, responsible for nearly half of the North American demand. The dealers suggested configurations to add and remove, and we adapted some of the packages slightly. Caterpillar also suggested the addition of high-cost options, but the dealers did not support this, so they were excluded.
The response from the dealers was very favorable, with many dealers projecting they would be able to satisfy 80% of their demand from these packages. In contrast, dealers estimated that the machines they currently kept in stock satisfied only 5-10% of their demand. Thus, standardization and option packaging represented an e↵ective way of potentially reducing configurations.
The second challenge came with the recession of 2009. Suddenly, every sale became crucial, and configuration reduction became a lower priority. However, with the economy showing signs of recovery in 2010 and with some changes to product sourcing at Caterpillar, reducing the number of configurations again gained importance. Caterpillar therefore put an updated price list for the 430E product line into e↵ect in April 2010; but, in order to minimize the risk of lost sales in the still di cult economic environment, the new price list was introduced alongside the old price list, rather than as a replacement.
Concurrent with this new price list, now featuring 124 configurations, Caterpillar introduced a 3-lane strategy for order fulfillment:
• Lane 1, the fastest lane, projected that orders on the four designated "most popular" fully configured machines would be satisfied within a few days.
• Lane 2 projected that orders on the remaining 120 choices, broken into the Loader, Comfort and Convenience, and Excavation packages, would be satisfied within a few weeks.
• Lane 3 projected any a-la-carte machine would be satisfied within a few months, as previously.
Upon implementation, Caterpillar experienced positive dealer feedback and large reductions in the number of unique configurations sold. This contrasted with previous attempts to reduce the size of the product line, based on a Pareto analysis of the top few dealers. These had likely been ine↵ective, in CAT's opinion, because they did not e↵ectively model the interaction of cost, customer preferences, and substitution, as we had.
It is worth noting that, to the best of our knowledge, neither standardization nor option packaging were being considered prior to the start of our project. These concepts were only developed after our analysis indicated that CAT needed to find a way to limit the number of configurations while not eliminating too many options. Our analysis gave CAT direction in implementing these new strategies, by indicating which sets of configurations were likely to be successful.
Moving Forward
In 2011 Caterpillar consolidated the two price lists into a single price list featuring options packages. They were able to capture over a quarter of their sales volume just in Lane 1; in contrast, the four top-selling configurations Caterpillar used to o↵er before this project captured 11.3% of both sales and total revenue for the 420E model (Figure 1 ). In addition, CAT enjoyed a reduction in warranty costs, attributable to many factors, including this project. Caterpillar has continued to focus their BHL o↵erings, for example reducing the 420E (now the 420F) Lane 1 o↵erings to three base machines by mid 2014. The other BHL lines have seen similar reductions.
Caterpillar has rolled out the lane approach to the entire company, making it an integral part of CAT's business strategy (Thomson Reuters (2014) ). While the methodologies used to determine the lane o↵erings in other divisions were somewhat simpler than the analysis done here, our work provided support for the corporate-wide Lane Strategy. In particular, our cost of complexity analysis approach has been applied to other divisions, such as Wheel Loaders, with the goal of capturing all the benefits and understanding all the consequences of proposed line changes. The detailed analysis and structured optimization approach reported in this paper allowed Caterpillar to counteract skepticism toward the lane approach embarked upon by BCP, prior to the CEO mandate, and successful implementation, of this strategy for the entire company.
Conclusion
We present a three-step procedure to restructure a product line, and demonstrate its successful application on the Backhoe Loader line at Caterpillar. Our methodology hinges on (i) The construction of migration lists to capture customer preferences and willingness to substitute; (ii) Explicitly capturing the (positive and negative) cost of complexity of o↵ering a specific product line across di↵erent functional areas; and (iii) integrating these tools within a mathematical programming framework to produce a final product line. One of the greatest strengths of our methodology is its flexibility -each step can be custom tailored to a company's particular setting, data availability and strategic needs, so long as it produces the necessary output for the next step of the algorithm.
As Caterpillar evolves, so has their Lane Strategy. For example Thomson Reuters (2014) discusses a new variation in which lanes may contain only partially completed machines, which can be finished to customer order as needed. Ideas such as these o↵er opportunities to extend our work to new problem domains -analytically characterizing the performance of such a delayed di↵erentiation strategy is an exciting and challenging problem.
Outside of Caterpillar, our work can be extended in several directions. First, explicit experimental validation of our empirical models -in particular our migration approach -would be of value. While this approach has been successfully applied in the construction equipment industry, further study could help establish how it could be applied in other sectors, and what changes might be necessary. For example, we set the list lengths based on consultation with Caterpillar executives. A better understanding of how long such lists really are, and how willing customers are to substitute (and whether there is any sort of explicit cost to this) would be of interest.
Second, as our methodology is applied to other settings, new constraints might need to be incorporated into our mathematical program. One of the benefits of our procedure is that our math programming formulation is flexible enough to accommodate other such constraints. Nevertheless, how it performs in other settings needs to be established.
Finally, the central thrust of this paper has considered the trade-o↵ between cost of complexity and product line breadth. Caterpillar has found what they believe to be the correct trade-o↵, which entailed a dramatic reduction in their product line. Di↵erent companies, in di↵erent industries, will have to answer this question for themselves. It is our hope that the methods we present in our paper can likewise help them find the answers they seek.
